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WHAT THE SUPREME COURT GIVETH, THE SUPREME
COURT TAKETH AWAY-Gardner v. Gardner
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Gardner u. Gardnerl the North Carolina Supreme Court
closed the door on all but a few of the plaintiffs it had only recently
invited to file claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The Gardner court held that it was unforeseeable, as a matter of
law, that a parent who did not witness the accident which caused
the death of her child would suffer severe emotional distress upon
learning that her child ,h ad died. 2 Thus, such a plaintiff cannot
establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 3
The court based its ruling on two factors: 1) plaintiff's "absence
from the time and place of the tort" and 2) plaintiff's "failure to
show that the defendant knew she was susceptible" to severe emotional distress. 4 By attaching so much importance to these factors, the court in Gardner severely limited the circumstances in
which a plaintiff may establish a viable claim. The decision represents a major restriction of the court's 1990 landmark decision in
Johnson u. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assocs., P.A.,5 and
rejects the North Carolina Court of Appeals broad interpretation
of Ruark's "foreseeability" test. However, by refusing to declare
that these proximity and susceptibility factors are determinative
while applying them a§ though they are, the court has created
confusion and uncertainty in the law of tort.
This Note reviews the Ruark decision and the cases decided
in the wake of its expansive "foreseeability" test. It then analyzes
1. 334 N.C. 662, 435 S.E.2d 324 (1993).
2. Id. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 328.
3.Id.
4.Id.
5. 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990). In Ruark, the court held that the only
requisite allegations for a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress are:
"1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct; 2) it was reasonably
foreseeable that such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress
... ; and 3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress."
Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. The court went on to state that the factors to
consider in making a foreseeability determination are "the plaintiff's proximity
to the negligent act", "the relationship between the plaintiff and the injured
person", and "whether the plaintiff personally observed the negligent act." Id., at
305, 395 S.E.2d at 98. The factors were not cited as elements of the claim. Id.
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the court's application of the factors established in Ruark to the
facts of Gardner and questions the court's failure to establish
more specific standards for determining foreseeability in negligent
infliction of emotional distress cases. Next, this Note explores the
possible effects of Gardner. This Note concludes that the Court
should have set forth clearer standards to better guide the lower
courts in deciding when a plaiutiff has stated a proper claim and
suggests how the "foreseeability" test could be limited to strike' a
balance between the extremes of compensating any person who
suffers distress as a result of an injury to a family member and
denying compensation to those who witness the injury or death of
a close family member and as a result suffers severe emotional
distress.

II.

THE CASE

On August 18, 1990, thirteen-year-old Seth Campbell Gardner was fatally injured when the truck in which he was a passenger struck a bridge abutment. 6 The vehicle was being driven by
his father, Benjamin Gardner.7 At the time of the accident, Seth's'
mother was at home several miles away.s After learning of the
accident by telephone, she went directly to the emergency room. 9
She was present as her son was wheeled into the emergency room
and observed rescue personnel attempting to resuscitate him. 10
After her son was taken to..-.a treatment room, Mrs. Gardner
waited in a private room. 11 She did not see her son again until
after she was notified of his death. 12
As administratrix of her son's estate, Mrs. Gardner filed a
wrongful death action against Benjamin GardnerP In her individual capacity, she asserted a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. 14 She claimed that she suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the defendant's negligence and that it

15.Id.
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6. Gardner , 334 N.C. 662, 663, 435 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1993).
7.Id.
8. Id.
9.Id.
10. Id. at 663, 435 S.E.2d at 326.
11. Gardner, 334 N.C. 662, 664, 435 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1993).
12.Id.
13.' Id. Mrs. Gardner was authorized by statute to bring this action as
administratrix of her son's estate. N.C. GEN. STAT. 28A-18-2 (1984).
14. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 664,435 S.E.2d at 326.
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was reasonably foreseeable that his conduct would cause her
severe emotional distress. 15
The defendant denied that plaintiff's severe emotional distress was reasonably foreseeable from his conduct and moved to
dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)( 6) of the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. 16 The parties stipulated for purposes of the
motion that their son had died as a result of the defendant's negligence and that the plaintiff had suffered severe emotional distress
as .a result of the accident and death of her sonP Thus, the only
issue before the court was whether it was reasonably foreseeable
that the defendant's conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress. The trial court ruled that, as a matter of law, the
plaintiff could not establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because she had not witnessed the accident and
was not in sufficiently close proximity to satisfy the "foreseeability
factors" set forth in Ruark .18 It entered summary judgment for the
defendant on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.19
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
entry of partial summary judgment on the negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim and held that the "defendant could have
reasonably foreseen that his negligence might be a direct and
proximate cause of the plaintiff's emotional distress."2o In doing
so, the court rejected the defendant's contention that in Ruark the
North Carolina Supreme Court had adopted a "close proximity"
requirement for foreseeability in the context of this tort. 21 The
court emphasized that under Ruark close proximity was one of the
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15. [d.
16. [d. at 664, 435 S.E.2d at 326. The trial court considered matters outside

the pleadings and treated the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule
56(c). [d.
17. [d.
18. [d.
19. Gardner, 334 N.C. 662, 664, 435 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1993). Pursuant to Rule

lis action as

n.

54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court certified the
entry of partial summary judgment for immediate appeal. Gardner, 334 N.C. at
662, 435 S.E.2d at 324.
20. [d. at 664, 435 S.E.2d at 326.
21. Gardner v. Gardner, 106 N.C. App. 635, 639, 418 S.E.2d 260, 263 (1992).
In rejecting defendant's argument, the court of appeals pointed to Justice
Meyer's dissent in Ruark, in which he stated that ·he had been unable to
persuade the majority to adopt a "close proximity" requirement. [d. Garner v.
Gardner, 106 N.C. at 638-39, 418 S.E.2d at 262-63 (citing Ruark, 327 N.C. at
309-14, 395 S.E.2d at 100-03 (Meyer, J., dissenting».
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factors to be considered on the question of foreseeability, but it
was not a requirement offoreseeability.22 Citing "common experience," the court stated that a parent who sees a dying child at the
hospital after an accident may suffer as much distress as a parent
who first sees the child at the scene of the accident.23
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, reversed the
court of appeals and affirmed the entry of summary judgment .for
the defendant on the plaintiff's claim. 24 Although the court
agreed that the close proximity factor suggested in Ruark was not
a requirement, it held that "the plaintiff's injury was not reason"
ably foreseeable and its occurrence was too remote from the negligent act itself to hold the defendant liable for such
consequences. "25

III.
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BACKGROUND

Prior to the Nprth Carolina Supreme Court's decision in
.Johnson v. Ruark, negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
in North Carolina were generally not permitted unless the emotional distress either resulted from physical injury or was severe
enough to cause physical injury.26 In Ruark, however, the North
22. Gardner v. Gardner, 106 N.C. App. at 638, 418 S.E.2d at 262. Judge
Eagles dissented and agreed with the defendant that because plaintiff did not
observe the accident and was not in close proximity to the negligent act, she
"failed to establish the sufficient - proximity to satisfy the foreseeability
requirements of Ruark." [d. at 640, 418 S.E.2d at 263 (Eagles, J ., dissenting).
23. [d. at 639, 418 S.E.2d at 263.
24. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 668, 435 S.E.2d at 328.
25. [d. In ruling that the "common experience" relied on by the court of
appeals was not enough, the court stated that "part of living involves some
unhappy and disagreeable emotions with which we must cope without recovery
of damages." [d. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 328. (quoting Gates v. Richardson, 719
P.2d 193, 198 (Wyo. 1986)).
26. See, e.g. , Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 198-99, 254 S.E.2d 611,623
(1979) (stating that it is "clear that plaintiff must show some physical injury
resulting from the emotional disturbance caused by defendant's alleged
conduct"); King v. Higgins, 272 N.C. 267, 158 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1967) (disallowing
recovery absent any "disfiguring injury"); Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498,
503, 112 S.E.2d 48, 52 (1960) (recovery for emotional distress allowed when
accompanied by simultaneous physical impact or injury). There were some
special exceptions to this general rule for cases involving negligent
transportation or mishandling of a corpse. See Stephenson v. Duke Univ., 202
N.C. 624,163 S.E. 698 (1932). For a comprehensive survey ofthe tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress in North Carolina, see Robert G. Byrd, Recovery
for Mental Anguish in North Carolina, 58 N.C. L. REV. 435 (1980).
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Carolina Supreme Court abolished the physical injury
requirement.27
In Ruark, the plaintiffs were the parents of a child who was
still born as a result of the defendant doctor's negligence. 28 After
an extensive review of North Carolina's treatment of negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the court held that "neither a
physical impact, a physical injury, nor a subsequent physical manifestation of emotional distress is an element of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress."29 The court held that to
state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, "a plaintiff must allege that 1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct, 2) · it was reasonably foreseeable that such conduct would
cause plaintiff severe emotional distress, ... and 3) the conduct
did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress."30 The
court defined severe emotional distress to include a wide range of
disorders that are generally recognized and diagnosed by trained
professionals. 31
The court identified three factors to be considered when determining the issue of foreseeability: 1) the plaintiff's proximity to
the negligent act; 2) the relationship between the plaintiff and the
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27. Ruark, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990) .
28. [d. at 286, 395 S.E.2d at 86.
29. Id. at 304,395 S.E.2d at 97. This holding is arguably in accord with prior
North Carolina case law, insofar as the earliest cases are concerned. See, e.g.,
Bailey v. Long, 172 N.C. 661, 90 S.E.2d 809 (1916) (husband could recover
damages for mental anguish suffered when his wife died as a result of the
doctor's negligence). Subsequent courts, however, quickly curtailed Bailey. See
Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 125, 126 S.E. 307, 310 (1925),
overruled on other grounds by Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital,
Inc., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980). As a result, the court's decision in
Ruark effectively overruled decades of case law. See supra note 26 and cases
cited therein.
30. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. The usefulness of
"foreseeability" as a restrictive aspect of a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress is discussed thoroughly by the court and questioned
vigorously by Justice Meyer in his lengthy dissent. Id. at 304-06, 395 S.E.2d at
97-98, 100-03. For a discussion of foreseeability standards applied in other
jurisdictions, see Tracy L. Hamrick, On A Clear Judicial Day in North
Carolina-Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics Smooths the Way for Plaintiffs' Claims
for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1714 (1991).
31. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. Specifically, the .court defined
severe emotional distress as "any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for
example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of
severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally
recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so." Id.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994

5

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 2

486

CAMPBELL

LAw

REVIEW

injured person; and 3) whether the phlintiff personally observed
the negligent act.32 The application of the foreseeability concept,
the court explained, "must be determined under all the facts
presented and should be resolved on a case-by-case basis by the
trial court and, when appropriate, by a jury."33 Applying these
factors to the facts in Ruark , the court concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations of emotional distress were sufficient to support
their cause of action. 34
The Ruark decision was accompanied by a strongly worded
dissent by Justice Meyer which focused on the difficulties
presented by the "foreseeability" concept. 35 Condemning the rule
adopted by the majority as "overbroad,"36 Justice Meyer criticized
the majority for providing "no real limitation on foreseeability."37
He predicted that the decision would invite a flood of litigation
which would have detrimental effects on the availability and price
of insurance and impose severe societal costS. 38
The Ruark decision sent shockwaves throughout the North
Carolina legal community. The "foreseeability" test adopted by
the court arguably converted North Carolina into one of the most
liberal jurisdictions in the country on the issue of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 39 The reaction to Ruark
32. Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
33. Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 309-14, 395 S.E.2d at 100~ 03 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer
also expressed strong reservations concerning the court's treatment of the
concepts of duty and proximate cause. Id. at 309-11, 395 S.E.2d at 100-01
(Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Webb also filed a dissent on the grounds that the
majority's holding represented a marked departure from previous decisions and
that reversal of the prior decisions was not justified. Id. at 318, 395 S.E.2d at
106 (Webb, J ., dissenting).
36. Id. at 313, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 309, 395 S.E.2d at ioo (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer
criticized the court for failing to establish "any limitations whatsoever on the
duty not to negligently inflict foreseeably serious emotional distress" and
"provid[ing] no guidance to the judges and juries that must implement it." Id. at
312-13, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 312, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
39. California at one time was thought to have the most liberal approach. See
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (requiring consideration of: 1)
whether plaintiff was in close proximity to the scene; 2) whether the plaintiff's
emotional distress resulted from the "sensory and contemporaneous observance
of the accident"; and 3) whether the plaintiff was "closely related" to the victim).
The Ruark factors are similar to those enumerated in Dillon. When Ruark was
decided, however, Dillon had been narrowed signific'a ntly by the California
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was dominated by concerns that the case opened the door to
unlimited liability for defendants.4o Members of the defense bar
feared that the "foreseeability" test would make it too easy for
plaintiffs to win large civil verdicts. 41 In addition, there was concern over the court's failure to provide practical standards or adequate guidance to the lower courtS. 42 The broad "foreseeability"
test adopted in Ruark had been rejected by a number of states in
favor of more definite guidelines.43 Most notably, the California
Supreme Court had recently rejected a standard substantially
similar to that established in Ruark, characterizing the "foreseeability" test as "unworkable" and "conf1,lsing."44 Following Ruark,
the North Carolina courts were expected to encounter the same
difficulties applying and interpreting the "foreseeability" test with
the results being uncertainty in the courts and inequity for the
parties. 45

I
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Supreme Court's decision in Thingv. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). Justice
Meyer criticized the majority for "go[ing] beyond even Dillon's broad approach."
Ruark, 327 N.C. at 308, 395 S.E.2d at 99 (Meyer, J ., dissenting). For further
discussion of the problems with the Dillon standards, see generally John L.
Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Towards a Unified Theory of Compensating
Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (1984)
(critical of Dillon for using foreseeability as a restriction); Note, Bystander
Recovery: A Policy Oriented Approach, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 877,888-98 (1987)
(discussing the difficulties of applying Dillon).
40. See Hamrick, supra note 30, at 1729-30.
41. Id. Justice Webb noted" that while the physical injury requirement is
"somewhat arbitrary" it does serve to limit the potential liability of defendants.
Ruark, 327 N.C. at 318, 395 S.E.2d at 106 (Webb, J., dissenting). As one
commentator noted, "with respect to mental "anguish claims . . . the fear of
indefinite liability is a legitimate one, and the need to impose reasonable limits
upon the extent of a defendant's responsibility clearly exists." Byrd, supra note
26, at 448.
42. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 312-13,395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 308-16, 395 S.E.2d at 99-104 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
44. See Thing, 771 P.2d at 918. Thing replaced the standards set forth in
Dillon, with the following requirements: 1) the plaintiff must be closely related to
t?e v~ctim; 2) plaintiff must have been present at the scene of the injury at the
time It occurred and had to be aware that the injury was occurring; and 3) the
plaintiff must have suffered serious emotional distress beyond that which would
be anticipated in a disinterested bystander. Thing, 771 P.2d at 829-30. See
supra note 39.
45. The Ruark court appeared unconcerned by this, however stating that
:'our trial courts have adequate means available to them for' disposing of
Improper claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and for adjusting
excessive or inadequate verdicts." Ruark, 327 N.C. at 306, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
Contra Thing, 771 P.2d at 833 (Kaufman, J., concurring) (recognizing that
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Justice Meyer's concerns were proven valid as the trial courts'
attempts to apply the "foreseeability" test set forth in Ruark to
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims were repeatedly
reversed by the court of appeals. 46 Whereas the trial courts narrowly applied the "foreseeability" test, the court of appeals applied
it in such a way that allowed an almost unlimited number of
plaintiffs to state a claim for emotional distress. The court of
appeals held in five decisions that a plaintiff with a close familial
relationship with a person who is injured or killed by the negligence of another may state a cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress without having been in close proximity to or
having observed the negligent act of the defendant. 47 Thus, under
the court of appeals' interpretation of Ruark and its "foreseeability" test, any person with a close familial relationship (i.e, parent!
child or husband/wife) to a person killed or injured by a defendant's negligence is a "foreseeable plaintiff" with a cause of action

"Dillon's confident prediction that future courts would be able to fix just and
sensible boundaries on bystander liability has been found to be wholly ill~sory
both in theory and practice").
46. See, e.g., Butz v. Holder, 112 N.C. App. 116, 434 S.E.2d 862; (1993);
Hickman v. McKoin, 109 N.C. App. 478, 428 S.E.2d 251 (1993); Anderson
Baccus, 109 N.C. App. 16, 426 S.E.2d 105 (1993); Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality
Ventures, 108 N.C. App. 668, 424 S.E.2d 676 (1993); Gardner v. Gardner, 106
N.C. App. 635, 418 S.E.2d 260 (19g-2). In each of the post-Ruark decisions, the
court of appeals reversed the trial court. This underscores the disagreement
among the trial and appellate judges as they attempted to define the limits of
Ruark. These cases also demonstrated that without clearer guidelines, trial
courts would find it nearly impossible ' to dispose of negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims through summary judgment.
47. See, e.g., Butz, 112 N.C. App. at 117, 434 S.E.2d at 863 (parents could
state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress following death of child
who was struck by a car while riding his bicycle); Hickman, 109 N.C. App. at 479,
428 S.E.2d at 252 (children who were not at the scene of the accident could state
a claim for emotional distress following the injury of their mother in an
automobile accident); Anderson, 109·N.C. App. at 25,426 S.E.2d at 110 (husband
who was not present at scene of accident could state a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress following death of wife and unborn child in
automobile accident); Sorrells, 108 N.C. App. at 672, 424 S.E.2d at 679 (parents
who were not present at scene of accident could state claim against bar that
served son alcohol for negligent infliction of emotional distress following death of
son in drunk driving accident); Gardner, 106 N.C. App. at 639,418 S.E.2d at 263
(mother who was not present at scene of accident could state a claim against
father of her sori who was driving at the time of the accident for emotional
distress resulting from the death of her son).

v.
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against the defendant for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 48
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Gardner, the North Carolina Supreme Court had its first
opportunity to reexamine its decision in Ruark and to provide
some much needed guidance to the lower courts on the proper
application of the "foreseeability" test enunciated in Ruark. On
October 8, 1993, the court issued its decision in Gardner which
reaffirmed its decision in Ruark. Applying Ruark to the facts in
Gardner, the court held that "plaintiff's injury was not reasonably
foreseeable and its occurrence was too remote for the negligent act
itself to hold the defendant liable for such consequences."49 Gardner makes it clear that a close familial relationship between the
plaintiff and the injured person for whom the plaintiff is concerned, is insufficient standing alone to establish the element of
foreseeability. Gardner thus significantly restricts the scope of
Ruark.
Once again shockwaves were felt throughout the legal community. This time, however, the bulk of the criticisms came from
plaintiffs' attorneys who felt that the court had so narrowed the
scope of Ruark as to make it difficult to ever succeed on a claim for
emotional distress.
In Gardner, the court based its holding on two factors: proximity and susceptibility. The court noted that the mother was several miles away when the accident occurred and stated that while
her absence from the scene of the accident is not determinative, it
unquestionably "militates" against the foreseeability of her resulting emotional distress. 5o The court reasoned that because she was
not in close proximity to, nor did she observe, the defendant's negligent act, she was not able "to see, hear or otherwise sense" the
48. Gardner, 106 N.C. App. at 639, 418, S.E.2d at 263.
49. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 668, 435 S.E.2d at 328. In the other part of a onetwo punch delivered to plaintiffs by the court that day, the court ruled in Sorrells
v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures, 334 N.C. 669, 674, 435 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1993),
that two parents who suffered emotional distress when their son was killed after
the defendant bar had served him too much alcohol had no claim. The court held
that the possibility that the defendant's negligence would lead to the son's death
and the parents' anguish was too remote to be foreseeable. The reasoning in
Sorrells is consistent with that in Gardner. The impact of Sorrells, however, will
be more limited than that of Gardner because the facts in Gardner more closely
match the factors set forth in Ruark.
50. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 327.
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accident or to perceive the injuries to her son. 51 Furthermore, the
court stated that "more important" than the mother's absence
from the scene of the accident was that "there was neither [an]
allegation nor [a] forecast of evidence that the defendant knew the
plaintiff was, subject to an .e motional pr mental disorder or other
severe disabling emotional or mental condition as a result of his
negligence and its consequences."52 Absent such knowledge, the
court said, such ali outcome cannot be held to be reasonably foreseeable and plaintiff failed to establish a claim. 53
A.

son,
time,
gants
strong
place
could
party
ment .
which

Proximity

While categorically rejecting any notion that any of the three
factors set forth in Ruark are determinative of foreseeability, the
Gardner court placed great emphasis on the fact that the plaintiff,
Mrs. Gardner, was not in close proximity to, nor did she observe,
the defendant's negligent act. 54 Although the court still adamantly insists that proximity is just one factor to be considered in
determining foreseeability, Gardner and subsequent cases make
it clear that nothing short of being present at the time the accident occurs or at least close enough to perceive the accident will
support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. For
example, in Sorrells v. M. Y.B. Hospitality Ventures, 55 the court
refused to ground the decision solely on the plaintiffs' absence
from the scene of the negligent act but did cite that absence as
particularly relevant. 56 Most recently, the court held in Anderson
v. Baccus ,57.that even though the plaintiff husband arrived at the
scene shortly after the accident and personally observed his wife
before she was removed from the wreckage, he was not in close

B.

51. [d.
52. [d. at 667,435 S.E.2d at 328 (emphasis added).
53. [d.
54. Gardner, 334 N.C. 662, 667-68, 435 S.E.2d 324,327-28 (1993). The court
stated that the plaintiff's absence from the scene "unquestionably militat[ed]
against the foreseeability of her emotional distress." [d. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at
327.
55. 334 N.C. 669, 435 S.E.2d 320 (1993). In Sorrels, the plaintiffs sought to
recover damages from the bar that had served their son alcohol prior to his death
in a drunk driving accident. [d.
56. [d. at 674, 435 S.E.2d at 323.
57. 335 N.C. 526, 439 S.E.2d 136 (1994).
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proximity to and did not observe the defendant's negligent act
and, thus, could not recover for emotional distress. 58
Attorneys, thus, are faced with a court that insists that proximity is only a factor in, but treats it as determinative of, foreseeability. As a result, an attorney who fails t6 bring a negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim because the plaintiff was not
on the scene of the accident may be committing malpractice. At
the same time, however, in view of Gardner, Sorrells, and Anderson, such a claim likely will be dismissed resulting only in wasted
time, money, and judicial resources. Rather than requiring litigants and trial courts to guess whether the proximity factor is
strong enough in a given case to support a claim, the court should
place some clear limits on proximity. 59 For instance, the court
could simply require that the plaintiff be on the scene when the
party for whom the plaintiff is concerned is injured. This requirement would give litigants and lower courts a clear standard by
which to make their decisions regarding negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims. At the same time, it would not limit
claims any more than they are presently limited under Gardner,
Sorrells, and Anderson . .

B.

Susceptibility

Susceptibility was not mentioned in Ruark, but it played a
key part in the Gardner decision. 60 The court's basic premise is
that it is not normal for a parent to experience severe emotional
distress, as defined in Ruark ,61 over the death of a child. 62 There58. On rehearing in Butz v. Holder, 113 N.C. App. 156, 437 S.E.2d 672 (1993),
the court of appeals read Gardner broadly to strike the emotional distress claim
even though the proximity factor was very strong.
59. See, e.g., Thing, 771 P.2d at 830 (recovery denied to mother who was
neither present at the scene nor aware that son was being injured); Kelley v.
Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 532 P.2d 673, 676 (Haw. 1975) (physical proximity
to scene is determining factor); Wilder v. City of Keene, 557 A.2d 636,639 (N.H.
1989) (no recovery for parents who did not see nor hear the collision); Barris v.
Grange Mut. Cos., 545 N.E.2d 83, 91 (Ohio 1989) (no recovery for parent who had
no sensory perception of events surrounding accident); Gain· v. Carroll Mill Co.,
787 P.2d 553, 557 (Wash. 1990) (to recover plaintiff must be at the scene of the
accident or arrive shortly after the accident).
60. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 328.
61. See supra note 31.
62. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 328. The court noted the
distinction drawn in Ruark between "temporary fright, disappointment and
regret," which by itself is not compensable, and "severe emotional distress" for
which a plaintiff may recover. [d. The court then concluded that while anyone
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fore, the court concluded that a claim for emotional distress '
requires reasonable foresight that the plaintiff will not only
become distraught, but also will suffer severe emotional distress. 63
This requirement is unusual in that it is contrary to the notion
that a defendant takes his victim as he finds him. Instead, it
allows only the uncommonly sensitive family members to recover
and then only if their unnatural susceptibility is known in
advance to the defendant.
Applying this standard in Gardner, the court held that
despite the fact that the plaintiff and defendant were married and
the defendant thus presumably knew the plaintiff very well, plaintiff failed to show that the defendant knew she was susceptible to
an emotional or mental disorder or other severe and disabling
mental condition as a result of his negligence and its
consequences. 64
Although the Gardner court characterized the three elements
of negligent infliction of emotional distress set forth in Ruark, 65 as
the "only requisite allegations," it appears that is not really what
the court meant. 66 Under Gardner, to establish the element of
foreseeability, the plaintiff must also allege and offer evidence sufficient to show that the defendant knew that the plaintiff was susceptible to severe emotional distress as a result of his negligent
act. 67 In both Sorrells and Anderson the court based its decision
to dismiss the plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims in part on the fact that they did not show that the defendant knew they were susceptible to severe emotional distress. 68
After Gardner, Sorrells, and Anderson, it is clear that a plaintiff who merely alleges that the severe emotional distress they suffered was a reasonably foreseeable con's equence of the defendant's
negligent conduct will almost certainly have their claim disshould foresee that virtually any parent will suffer some emotional distress . .. to
establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress the law requires
reasonable foresight of an emotional or mental disorder or other severe disabling
emotional or mental condition." Id. (emphasis added).
63.Id.
64.Id.
65 . See supra note 5.
66. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 665,435 S.E.2d at 327.
67. In Butz, 113 N.C. App. 156, 437 S.E.2d 672 (1993), the court of appeals
interpreted Gardner to require plaintiffs to allege and prove knowledge of their
susceptibility to severe emotional distress. Id.
68. See Sorrells, 334 N.C. at 674, 435 S.E.2d at 323; Anderson, 335 N.C. at
532, 439 S.E.2d at 140.
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tl distress. 63
) the notion
Instead, it
's to recover
known in

missed. 69 It is not clear, however, what exactly the plaintiff must
allege. For instance, it is unclear whether previous knowledge of
susceptibility is required in all claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress or only when the plaintiff is absent from the
scene of the negligent act.70 Furthermore, it will be ,t he rare case
in which a defendant has actual knowledge of an individual's particular susceptibilities in advance of the negligent conduct. While
it may be desirable to limit liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress, in Gardner the court appears to have drawn a line
that essentially eliminates the claim altogether. If negligent infliction of emotional distress is to have any meaningful application,
such knowledge cannot always be required. 71
The long-range effect of the susceptibility factor will depend
in part on whether it is a strict test of foreseeability, or only one of
several factors. Gardner appears to say that prior knowledge of
susceptibility is a requirement.72 In Sorrells, however, the court
was careful to point out that there are no requirements, only a
number of factors to be considered. 73 Regardless of the ultimate
resolution, the court's use of the "foreseeability" test is confusing.
If the court's purpose is to limit the application of negligent infliction of emotional distress, then it can do so without trying to fit
prior knowledge of susceptibility under the "foreseeability" test.
Restrictions could be based on the relationship between the plaintiff and the injured or deceased person74 and the proximity of the
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69. See, e.g., Butz, 113 N.C. App. 156,437 S.E.2d 672 (1993).
. 70. The susceptibility factor has been applied.only in cases where the plaintiff
did not personally observe the defendant's negligent act.
71. It is questionable whether the plaintiffs in Ruark could recover under
Gardner. The plaintiff-father probably would not be able to establish a claim
because he did not allege and probably could not show that the defendant doctor
had any knowledge of his emotional susceptibility. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 336, 395
S.E.2d at 98. Furthermore, because the father did not witness the doctor's
negligent acts and omissions, he could not meet the proximity requirement. Id.
Although the father alleged that he observed many of the events surrounding the
stillbirth of his child, the doctor's negligence occurred prior to the birth during
the prenatal care. Id. Even though the mother did not allege that the doctor
knew she was susceptible to distress, that requirement would not be as critical in
her case. Id. She was not a third-party bystander to the doctor's negligence, but
a victim of it. Id. Therefore she probably could have proceeded with her claim.
72. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 667,435 S.E.2d at 328.
73. Sorrells, 334 N.C. at 674, 435 S.E.2d at 323.
74. See, e.g., Thing, 771 P.2d at 829-30, (mother of victim is "closely related");
Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 587 (Cal. 1988) (unmarried cohabitant is not
entitled to recover).
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plaintiff to the negligent conduct. 75 These requirements would
sufficiently limit liability, but allow recovery for legitimate claims
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

V.

CONCLUSION

In Gardner the North Carolina Supreme Court held that, as a
matter of law, a mother who suffered severe emotional distress as
a result of the death of her son in an automobile accident, but who
was not present at the scene of the accident, cannot recover damages for emotional distress from the defendant driver, her husband, because such damages are unforeseeable. In so ruling, the
court severely limited the scope of Ruark and the circumstances
under which a plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Gardner court, however, insisted that the
validity of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims be
assessed on a case-by-case basis and refused to set any clear standards for determining whether the severe emotional distress complained of was foreseeable. The experience in other jurisdictions
warns that vague "foreseeability factors" can cause confusion and
uncertainty. The ad hoc approach the court has chosen to take
will foster uncertainty and confusion among North Carolina
courts and result in inconsistent treatment of cases. The trial
courts and litigants need better guidance from the court as to
when severe emotional distress is foreseeable. The court should
clearly state that to recover for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, a plaintiff must personally observe the negligent act of
the defendant, be a close family member of the victim, and suffer
severe emotional distress beyond that which one would expect to
result from any similar tragedy. A plaintiff should not be required
to show that the defendant knew ofthe plaintiff's susceptibility to
suffer severe emotional distress . . In the wake of Gardner, unless
these or similarly clear standards are· adopted, the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress will provide, if any, little remedy for plaintiffs.

Alice McNeer

75. See supra note 59.
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